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14 March 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: NSC Meeting to consider the revised drafts of
NSCIDs #1 through #6 and proposed draft NSCID #7

9:00 a.m. Thursday, 13 March 1958
The White House

ATTENDANCE: NSC and Others

Mr. Dulles and General Hull were seated at the table. Others of the Intelligence Community present included, of the IAC, Mr. Arneson, General Schow, General Lewis, General Collins, Admiral Frost. Generals Cabell and Truscott accompanied Mr. Dulles.

1. General Cutler announced that the draft NSCIDs #1 through #7 submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence were to be considered for approval. He said that #1 to #6 were revisions of old directives; #7 was a new one concerning which the Department of Defense had certain objections. He would present #1 to #6 first, then take up #7 separately. He noted that the Joint Chiefs of Staff letter of transmittal made some reference to joint intelligence which was not entirely clear and which General Taylor would probably explain in due course. He asked Mr. Dulles to comment.

2. Mr. Dulles explained that the Intelligence Community had endeavored to meet fully the requirements for revision recommended by the President's Board of Consultants. He said that he had received the full and complete support of all IAC members at all times; cooperation in the Intelligence Community was of the highest possible order. He did not feel that the references to consultation and concurrence hampered him in any way but, on the contrary, reflected the way the Community had always operated so successfully. With regard to the President's Board comments regarding his statutory responsibilities for protection of intelligence sources and methods, he was aware that this was a matter in which the President was deeply concerned. He pointed out that his authority was limited in this respect, however, in a very practical way so far as other agencies were concerned. He had no desire to assume responsibility in this respect that he could not fulfill. With regard to the reference made by the JCS in their letter of concurrence to "joint intelligence", he was not entirely clear as to just what the Joint Chiefs had in mind.

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3. General Cutler then called on General Hull who said that the President's Board was impressed with the fine work done by the IAC agencies in preparing these revisions and the Board thought the Intelligence Community was to be congratulated thereon. The Board had few comments to make on these revisions. The Board thought the numerous references to the Director's consulting with and seeking the concurrence of IAC members might have the effect of watering down his coordinating responsibility. The Board would have preferred to see this taken care of by a single paragraph perhaps, instead of repeated so often. The Board also considered that paragraph 17 of draft of #1 should be revised to increase the Director's authority to protect intelligence sources and methods. In the draft of #2, the Board thought that paragraph 4 opened the door for CIA to engage in overt collection and was an invitation to duplication of overt collection by other agencies. The Board thought this should be limited.

4. General Cutler then asked General Taylor to comment on the reference to joint intelligence in the Joint Chiefs of Staff letter of transmittal. General Taylor called on General Collins who explained that joint intelligence was that intelligence produced by the military departments jointly for use in missions assigned by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and in which the IAC as such was not concerned. Mr. Quarles amplified this explanation. He said that he had been discussing immediate problems concerned therewith with Mr. Dulles and that they were working out a solution. The President in a most outspoken comment said that under the conditions of modern war, every department and agency of the government was affected and would have responsibilities; that all significant intelligence appraisals would have implications for the national security and would be "national intelligence" for which the NSC would look to the CIA. He emphasized the high competence of the CIA and the vital coordinating role of the Director.

5. Mr. Brundage also raised a question as to possible duplication of the overt collection referred to in paragraph 4 of the draft of #2.

6. General Cutler explained that the draft of #6 referred to ELINT; that it was associated with NSCID #9 dealing with communications intelligence which was not ready for presentation and also with the study made by the Baker Board. He recommended delaying action on #6 until the revision of #9 was ready for consideration and reports directed by the Baker Board were ready for consideration. General Cutler then raised the question of the draft of #7 dealing with critical intelligence communications. He noted that the letter of transmittal referred to some [redacted] involved and also that the Department of Defense had requested delaying approval of this draft pending completion of studies currently under way in the Department of Defense. Dr. Killian remarked on the need for a management study and the defining of critical intelligence and the establishment of priorities before action on the item. Mr. Dulles, responding to a request for his views, suggested delaying action on the proposed NSCID but recommended

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
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that the NSC direct action (as set forth in Para 7-a, b, c of his letter of transmittal of this document) which Mr. Dulles outlined orally. Mr. Dulles said that this action would enable the Intelligence Community to get on with this important task in which the President and the NSC were so vitally concerned. Mr. Dulles also said that with reference to the overt collection by CIA in Paragraph 4 of the draft of No. 2, he would like to add a provision that this collection would only be done in full coordination with the Department of State and Chief of Mission.

8. General Cutler then summarized the report of the action taken - in brief, approval of NSCIDs #1 through #5 with certain minor modifications to be undertaken by the Intelligence Community on #1 and #2, deferring action on #6 and directing the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence to undertake certain action with respect to the subject of the draft NSCID #7 and to report thereon by 1 May. General Cutler also referred to the fact that the President had directed the Director of Central Intelligence to consult with the IAC and USCIB and submit within 6 months a report for Council consideration establishing a single group to assist and advise him in discharging his coordinating responsibility for Special and other forms of foreign intelligence. This subject was not discussed in any way at this meeting.

9. This part of the discussion ended at 10:00 a.m.



L. K. TRUSCOTT, JR.
General, USA (Ret.)
Deputy Director (Coordination)

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1. RECOMMENDED REVISIONS OF NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVES

(Memos for NSC from Acting Executive Secretary, same subject, dated February 5, 1958; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated March 4, 6, and 12, 1958; Memo for All Holders of SECRET Memo of February 5, dated March 7, 1958)

- a. Noted and discussed the draft National Security Council Intelligence Directives (NSCIDs) submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and transmitted by the reference memoranda of February 5, ^{(two) and March 7,} 1958; in the light of (1) the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff thereon, transmitted by the reference memorandum of March 4, ^{and} 1958; (2) the comments by the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities, transmitted by the reference memorandum of March 6, 1958; ~~and (3) the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the revision of NSCID No. 1 (submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and transmitted by the reference memorandum for All Holders dated March 7, 1958), transmitted by the reference memorandum of March 12, 1958~~
- b. Noted the President's statement, with respect to the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff relative to "joint intelligence", ^{because} that ^{each} under the conditions of modern warfare nearly every department and agency of ~~the~~ Government would have responsibilities, ^{each} ~~Accordingly, it is difficult to see how any single~~ significant ^{appraisal} [item of] intelligence would ~~not~~ have implications

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The National Security Council would be
for "National Intelligence", for which the National Security Council looks to the Central Intelligence Agency.

- c. Approved the draft NSCIDs Nos. 1 through 5, subject to modifications to be prepared by the Director of Central Intelligence and submitted for memorandum action by the Council, along the following lines:

- (1) In draft NSCID No. 1, paragraph 17 should be modified to authorize the Director of Central Intelligence to direct the heads of the intelligence agencies, as appropriate, to investigate any unauthorized disclosure of intelligence sources and methods.
- (2) In draft NSCID No. 2, paragraph 4 should be modified to provide that the Central Intelligence Agency ^{abroad} not engage in overt collection ^{coordinated} except as requested ^{or Chief of Mission} by the Department of State or Defense ^{to supplement} *The perfection* ~~these~~ overt collection assignments of each.

- d. Deferred action on draft NSCID No. 6, dealing with "ELINT", pending submission and consideration of a new NSCID dealing with "COMINT".
- e. With reference to draft NSCID No. 7 ("Critical Intelligence Communications"):

- (1) Requested the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence, ^{Recommendations in the letter} in the light of draft NSCID No. 7, the Defense-JCS comments thereon, and the

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discussion at this meeting (especially the comments by Dr. Killian on the need for a management study and establishment of priorities), to prepare a joint report for submission to the Council by May 1, 1958, as to the communications means necessary to ensure timely and adequate transmission of critical intelligence.

- (2) At the same time and in connection with the above joint report, requested the Director of Central Intelligence, in consultation with the members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee, ^{and on a continuing basis} to define critical intelligence; to establish uniform criteria for the identification, selection and designation of relative priority for the transmission of critical intelligence; and to provide the Secretary of Defense with guidance as to the communications requirements of the intelligence community for the transmission of critical intelligence.

- f. Noted that the President has directed the Director of Central Intelligence, after consultation with the Intelligence Advisory Committee and the United States Communications Intelligence Board, to submit within six months *recommendation, accompanied by an appropriate* for Council consideration a *draft NSCDD* [establishing] a single group to assist and advise the Director of Central Intelligence in discharging his responsibility for

the coordination of all operations concerned with both special and other forms of intelligence which together constitute the foreign intelligence effort of the United States. [Such a single group would be assigned the policy, coordinating and supervisory responsibilities presently assigned to USCIB and IAC (the remaining functions of USCIB and IAC to be redistributed to appropriate subcommittees).] When this action has been completed, it ^{MAY} [will] be necessary to review and modify appropriately certain of the draft NSCIDs referred to above.

NOTE: The actions in c, d, e-(2) and f above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Director of Central Intelligence for appropriate action.

The action in e-(1) above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence for appropriate action.

2. SIGNIFICANT WORLD DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING U. S. SECURITY

Noted and discussed an oral briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence on the subject, with specific reference to developments in the Soviet ballistic missiles program; the situations in Indonesia and North Africa; the recent election in the Sudan; and recent developments in the Middle East.